Hiding Faces in Plain Sight: Disrupting AI Face Synthesis with
  Adversarial Perturbations by Li, Yuezun et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1
Hiding Faces in Plain Sight: Disrupting AI Face
Synthesis with Adversarial Perturbations
Yuezun Li, Xin Yang, Baoyuan Wu and Siwei Lyu, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Recent years have seen fast development in synthe-
sizing realistic human faces using AI technologies. Such fake faces
can be weaponized to cause negative personal and social impact.
In this work, we develop technologies to defend individuals from
becoming victims of recent AI synthesized fake videos by sabotag-
ing would-be training data. This is achieved by disrupting deep
neural network (DNN) based face detection method with specially
designed imperceptible adversarial perturbations to reduce the
quality of the detected faces. We describe attacking schemes
under white-box, gray-box and black-box settings, each with
decreasing information about the DNN based face detectors. We
empirically show the effectiveness of our methods in disrupting
state-of-the-art DNN based face detectors on several datasets.
Index Terms—Deep learning, video forensics, adversarial per-
turbation noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
THe recent advances in machine learning and the availabil-ity of vast volume of online personal images and videos
have drastically improved the synthesis of highly realistic
human faces in images [1], [2] and videos [3], [4], [5], [6], and
tools that help to make them1. While there are interesting and
creative applications of the AI face synthesis systems, they can
also be weaponized due to the strong association of faces to
identify an individual. The potential threats range from revenge
pornographic videos of a victim whose face is synthesized and
spliced in, to realistic videos of state leaders seeming to make
inflammatory comments they never actually made or a high-
level executive commenting about her company’s performance
to influence the global stock market.
Foreseeing this threat, several forensic techniques aiming
to detect AI synthesized faces in images or videos have been
proposed recently [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. However, given
the speed and reach of the propagation of online media, even
the currently best forensic techniques will largely operate in a
postmortem fashion, applicable only after an AI synthesized
fake face image or video emerges. On the other hand, current
AI face synthesis methods predicate on the availability of face
sets that are automatically detected and cropped faces from
an individual’s online personal images or videos as training
data, Figure 1. For effective synthesis, the size of the face set
should be sufficiently large, typically in the range of thousands
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1The most notable example of AI face synthesis system is the freely
available FakeApp https://github.com/deepfakes.
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Fig. 1. Overview of disrupting AI face synthesis. We aim here is to use
adversarial perturbations (amplified by 30 for better visualization)
to distract DNN based face detectors, such that the quality of the
obtained face set as training data to the AI face synthesis is reduced.
of high resolution faces, with diverse orientations, expressions
and lighting conditions.
As such, a method that can sabotage automatic face de-
tection with fewer actual faces and more non-faces in the
resulting face set can significantly slow down the production
of AI synthesized faces. This is because if the quality of the
automatically detected face set is bad, then faces in the images
or videos may have to be manually located. Compared to the
passive forensic techniques, this is a more effective proactive
approach to protect individuals from becoming the victims of
such attacks. In this work, we study adversarial perturbations
to deep neural network (DNN) based face detectors as a
countermeasure to AI synthesized faces, which are specially
designed signals added to images that are imperceptible to
human eyes but can result in detection failures, Figure 1.
We target the DNN based face detectors as they achieve the
best face detection performance to date [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19] as well as improved robustness to variations
in pose, expression and occlusion. They are expect to replace
non-DNN based methods in the coming years and become
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mainstream methods. We start with a new white-box adversar-
ial perturbation generation method, where we have knowledge
of internal details of the DNN model including its structure and
parameters. The white-box adversarial perturbation generation
is cast as a constrained optimization problem, the objective
function of which aims to increase the two type of errors for
a face detector, namely mis-detections and false detections.
For a specific face detector, mis-detections correspond to true
faces that are not found and false detections are non-faces that
are identified as faces. We employ gradient based method to
optimize this objective function using back-propagation of the
DNN model.
The applicability of the white-box adversarial perturbation
generation scheme may be limited due to the requirements on
knowing the network parameters, so we extend to the more
general settings where we assume less knowledge about the
underlying DNN structure and parameter (i.e., gray-box and
black-box settings). First we describe a randomized gradient
update to reduce the dependency on network parameters in
generating adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, due to the
complexity of the DNN architecture search, existing DNN-
face detectors rely on a small number of architectures that
have been proven effective, and different face detectors are
usually obtained by fine tuning these standard network ar-
chitectures, we can create adversarial perturbations generated
for commonly used base network models for a compound
attack taking advantage of the few existing variants of base
models. To the best of our knowledge, our method is the
first adversarial perturbation generation method dedicated to
DNN based face detectors under the gray-box and black-box
settings.
Experimental results on three widely used benchmark data
sets, i.e., WIDER [20], 300-W [21] and UMDFaces [22]
show the effectiveness of our method to reduce the data
utility quality in comparison with various state-of-the-art face
detectors, and robustness with regards to JPEG compression,
additive noise and blurring. Adversarial perturbations targeting
face detectors could be used as a user or platform-initiated
approach to “pollute” the face set of individuals, thus helps
to prevent bulk re-use of online personal images/videos as
training data to create a synthetic face.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
covers the background and related works on AI based face
synthesis, detection of AI synthesized faces, face detection,
adversarial perturbation to DNN models. Section III describes
the details of our method generating adversarial noise to
perturb DNN based face detectors. Section IV describes the
experiments we conduct for efficacy demonstration. Section V
concludes the paper with discussion and future works.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. AI Face Synthesis
Synthesizing realistic faces using algorithms has been an
important task for computer vision and graphics for over three
decades. There exists sophisticated computer graphics systems
(e.g., 3D Studio Max and Maya) and high resolution 3D
surface models of faces to render high-quality realistic human
faces. However, the process is lengthy, costly and technically
demanding for ordinary users.
This has been significantly changed with the recent advent
of data-driven face synthesis methods based on deep neural
networks, which lead to more realistic synthesized faces yet
with considerable reduction in time and cost. For example,
the DeepFake systems generate face replacement videos
where one person’s face is replaced with synthesized face
of the other with the same facial expressions. Whole face
or upper-body reenactment is achieved with algorithms such
as Face2Face [3] or DeepPortrait [5]. Even more impressive
are faces generated completely using generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [23], which have the capacity of generating
highly realistic facial details [2] and different facial styles [1].
Underneath all data-driven face synthesis methods are ma-
chine learning models that need to be trained using large
number of detected, cropped and aligned faces that are au-
tomatically extracted from online images and videos using
state-of-the-art face detection methods.
B. Forensic Detection of AI Synthesized Faces
Several methods have been recently proposed to detect
AI synthesized faces. The method in [8] is based on the
observation that synthesized face in videos lack eye blinking
due to an intrinsic bias of the training face set obtained from
image search engine. Another method [9] detects synthesized
faces using inconsistent 3D orientations of synthesized faces.
DNN based detection algorithms identifies synthesized faces
using artifacts introduced in face warping [11], or in the
synthesis of eye, mouth or face contours [12], or directly via
a trained convolutional neural network [7]. The method of
[10] incorporates a recursive neural network to detect temporal
consistency of synthesized faces across different video frames.
The work in [24], [25] introduced a large face manipulation
dataset in order to alleviate the shortage of training sampling
for detecting AI synthesized faces.
Despite these aforementioned forensic methods have
achieved various levels of success in detecting images/videos
containing AI synthesized faces, they are passive defensive
methods that are only applicable after the fake media have
propagated online. Given the fast speed of fake images/videos
propagate online, these passive defensive methods are not
sufficient to combat AI synthesized fake faces.
C. Face Detection
Early face detectors examine local image regions in a sliding
window fashion for patterns resembling faces. The first effi-
cient and effective face detector [26] uses Haar-type features in
a cascaded classifier based on AdaBoost. Subsequently, more
robust, effective and efficient face detectors are proposed in
the literature based on various feature types such as LBP [27],
SURF [28], [29] and DPMs [30]. Using the HOG feature [31],
software package DLib represents the state-of-the-art for the
pre-DNN face detection methods.
Recently, DNN based face detectors start to becoming
mainstream with their high performance and improved ro-
bustness with regards to variations in pose, expression and
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 3
occlusion. Due to the prohibitive cost of optimizing network
structures, existing DNN based face detectors concentrate on
three common architectures from general object detectors, i.e.,
RCNN [32], Faster-RCNN [33] and SSD [34]. Detectors based
on RCNN, e.g., [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], first
identify proposed regions from selective search [42] and then
classify each region proposal as a face or non-face using a
RCNN. Faster-RCNN based face detectors [13], [14], [15] use
Region Proposal Networks (RPN) to generate initial region
proposals and is more efficient than those based on RCNN.
RPN generates a set of anchor boxes on the image that are
potentially faces and predicts the confidence score of being
a proposal and bounding box offset for each anchor box in
a single forward pass. Then the generated proposals will be
further refined to the final face score. Running efficiency of
face detection can be further improved with the SSD-based
methods [16], [17], [18], [19], which locate a set of anchor
boxes in the input image, and then predicts the confidence
score and bounding box offset. Due to the great performance
of VGG [43] and ResNet [44] architecture, almost all of these
face detectors use them as base network.
D. Adversarial Perturbation to Deep Neural Networks
Adversarial perturbation is a specially constructed noise that
induces minimal visual distortion but can change the result
of a DNN based algorithm on the perturbed image, taking
advantage of the sensitivity of DNNs to the input.
Many adversarial perturbation schemes have been developed
to attack state-of-the-art DNN based image classifiers. In
a white-box attack [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51],
[52], [53], the attacker knows the details of the DNN model,
including the network architecture and all parameters such as
connection weights and biases. Adversarial perturbations can
then be generated by minimizing a loss function with respect
to the input image aiming to changing the classification results
with minimal distortions. Since the details of the DNN model
in question are accessible, the gradient of loss function can be
computed with a back propagation type algorithm and used to
maximize the loss function. In contrast, in a black-box attack
[54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], the attacker has no knowledge
of the DNN model. The only information is the final output
of DNN model, i.e., the predicted labels or the corresponding
confidence score.
Recently, adversarial perturbation is extended from attack-
ing image classifiers to object detectors, e.g., [60], [61], [62],
[63], [64], and specifically, face detectors [65]. In contrast to
image classifiers where only outputs one class label for an
image, object detectors have multiple outputs, including the
bounding box locations, class label and detection confidence
scores. As such, generating adversarial perturbation for object
detectors is more complicated than for image classifiers.
We cannot directly adopt adversarial perturbation methods
designed for image classification to the case of object or
face detectors. In particular, we need to extend the definition
of gray-box and black-box setting of adversarial perturbation
generation for face detection, as described subsequently.
III. METHOD
We describe our method in detail in this section. We start
with the method for white-box attack, where we assume access
to the DNN model of the face detector. We then generalize
the white-box attack to the more general case where the DNN
model is not completely visible.
A. White-box adversarial Perturbation Generation
1) Notations & Definitions: . We use [n] as a shorthand
for set {1, · · · , n}. I0 ∈ [255]Sx×Sy×3 is a 8-bit RGB image
that contains faces. We use a quadruple b = (x, y, w, h) to
represent a bounding box, where x, y are the left and the
top coordinates, and w, h are the width and height of the
bounding box. For two bounding boxes b = (x, y, w, h) and
b′ = (x′, y′, w′, h′), we compute their intersection over union
(IoU) score as
IoU(b,b′) =
∆w∆h
w′h′ + wh−∆w∆h,
∆w = min{x′ + w′, x+ w)−max(x′, x),
∆h = min(y′ + h′, y + h)−max(y′, y).
IoU takes values in the range of [0, 1], and it is one when b and
b′ completely overlap and zero when they have no overlapping
at all. With a slight abuse of notation, we use I0(b) to denote
the sub-image of I0 restricted to bounding box b.
It is a common step in efficient DNN face detectors to
first find face proposals, which are potential candidate regions
corresponding to faces. Using face proposals avoids the more
expensive sliding window search. We denote P = {(bj)}nj=1
2 as the set of bounding boxes of n face proposals obtained
on image I0. For different DNN based face detectors, face
proposals are in different forms. The simplest cases are all
rectangular regions of fixed sizes in I0 (e.g., [35], [36]).
In faster-RCNN based face detector (e.g., [13], [14], [15]),
the face proposals are generated by region proposal network.
SSD based face detectors (e.g., [16], [17], [18], [19]) does
not explicitly generate face proposals but directly adjusts the
predefined anchor boxes to detections in a single pass.
For each face proposal bpj , the confidence score cj =
F(I0(b
p
j )) is computed with the predictor F, which is usually
formed in a DNN based face detector using base networks
chosen from several widely used architectures, such as VGG
[43] or ResNet [44]. When cj is greater than a pre-set threshold
θd (we choose θd = 0.5), in which case b
p
j is added to the set
of detected faces. We define G = {bgi }mi=1 as the set of the
bounding boxes of all detected faces that are treated as ground
truth detections. A face proposal with bounding box bpj is a
potential true detection if maxi∈[m] IoU(b
g
i ,b
p
j ) ≥ θp (we
choose θp = 0.3), and is a potential false detection otherwise.
We denote Iptd = {j|maxi∈[m] IoU(bgi ,bpj ) ≥ θp} as the index
set of all potential true detections, and Ipfd = [n] \ Iptd as the
set of all potential false detections out of all face proposals.
2In practice, non-maximum suppression (NMS) is usually used to remove
nearby proposals corresponding to the same face. Here, we keep all proposals
instead, so the adversarial perturbation will affect the final detections.
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2) Formulation: The white-box adversarial perturbation
generation for image I0 works with the face proposals P. This
is cast as a constrained optimization problem maximizing the
cross-entropy loss with regards to the adversarial perturbation
image z. Specifically, we solve for
max
z
∑
j∈Iptd log(1− c˜j) +
∑
j∈Ipfd δ{F(I0(b
p
j ))≥ρ} · log c˜j
s.t. c˜j = F((I0 + z)(b
p
j )), ‖z‖2 ≤ . (1)
Here c˜j is the confidence score of the same face proposal in
the adversarially perturbed image I = I0 + z and δ{c} is the
indicator function that is 1 when the condition c is true and 0
otherwise. In practice, the number of potential false detections
may be large, so we introduce a threshold ρ (we choose ρ =
1000) to only include those with top confidence scores in the
objective function. The end result of optimizing (1) is fewer
true detections and more false detections will be included in
the final detection set. As such, our method effectively reduces
the data utility quality of the detected face set when used as
training data for AI face synthesis systems.
3) Optimization: Solution to Eq.(1) can be obtained using
a projected gradient ascent algorithm. Starting with I0, at
the t-th iteration, we update the current estimation of It
by first moving it along the direction of the gradient (or
sub-gradient when the network involves non-differentiable
activaction functions such as ReLU or leaky ReLU) of the
objective function of (1), which is shorthanded as L(z), with
a small step size γt > 0, as
zt+1 = zt + γt∇L(zt). (2)
The gradient is computed using the chain rule as
∇L(z) =
∑
j∈Ipfd
δ{F(I0(bpj ))>ρ}
c˜j
∂F
∂z
−
∑
j∈Iptd
1
1− c˜j
∂F
∂z
, (3)
where ∂F∂z is the gradient of the DNN model F with regards
to its input computed with the back-propagation algorithm
based on the chain-rule [66]. Using model gradient makes the
search for adversarial perturbation efficient but it also entails
a dependence on the details of the underlying DNN model.
Step size γt is determined to ensure that the update satisfies
the constraint as
γt = argmax
γ
{
γ
∣∣∣∣ ‖zt + γ∇L(zt)‖2 ≤  &L(zt + γ∇L(zt)) > L(zt).
}
. (4)
The solution is obtained by a 1D line search procedure. We
repeat Eqs.(2)-(4) until the algorithm converges to a solution z,
then we generate the perturbed image by projecting I = I0+z
to the proper RGB value range.
However, face proposals extracted from the perturbed image
I may be different with those extracted from the original
image I0, so running the aforementioned algorithm directly
we cannot precisely affect the final face detection result. To
handle this issue, we use a technique known as warm start
[47]. Specifically, instead of running the Eqs.(2)-(4) until
convergence, we run one round of the update and obtain a
perturbed image I˜. Then we set I0 = I˜, and run the DNN
based face detector F on the updated I0 to initiate a new run
of optimization of Eqs.(2)-(4). This procedure is repeated until
either (1) a total number of iterations T has been achieved
or (2) no potential true detections in the perturbed images
can be extracted (i.e., all true faces have been concealed
from the image). The effectiveness of the white-box attack
to state-of-the-art DNN based face detectors is experimentally
demonstrated in Section IV.
B. Gray-box Adversarial Perturbation Generation
To be able to compute the the gradient, Eq.(4), the white-
box adversarial perturbation generation method requires full
knowledge of the base network in the DNN based face
detector. This limits the applicability of white-box attack,
especially when we have no access to the full base network
model of the face detector.
Nevertheless, current state-of-the-art DNN based face detec-
tors rely on two variants of the base network3, namely VGG
[43] or ResNet [44], thus the vulnerability of one DNN based
face detector is expected to be shared by other DNN based
face detectors using the same base network but with different
parameters. Therefore, it is possible to extend the white-
box adversarial perturbation generation to gray-box adversarial
perturbation generation, where we assume the targeted DNN
based face detector has the same base network as a known
DNN based face detector. We develop adversarial perturbation
generation method based on the latter and apply it to the attack
of the former.
Our solution is to reduce reliance of the adversarial pertur-
bation generation to the exact values of network parameters
of a given base network by randomizing the gradient, as
I˜t = It + γt(∇L(It) + nt), (5)
where nt is a sample from i.i.d. zero-mean white Gaussian
noise with a small standard deviation σ. This is equivalent
to a stochastic perturbation to the gradient, and as the update
in Eq.(5) does not follow the exact gradient obtained from a
fixed set of parameters, this measure can extend the white-box
attack to a gray-box setting.
C. Black-box Adversarial Perturbation Generation
The more challenging setting is when we have no knowl-
edge about the base network structure or parameter, other than
that the face detector is based on a DNN model. In this work,
we define black-box attack to DNN based face detectors as
where we have no knowledge of the network structure or the
parameters other than that it is based on a DNN model4.
As mentioned previously, existing DNN based face detectors
use two basic types of base networks, and future generation
3We surveyed 29 state-of-the-art face detection methods on the leader board
of face detection challenge on the WIDER dataset [20], 27 are DNN based
face detectors, and the top performance is achieved from the subset of 23
methods, using either Faster-RCNN (5) or SSD (18) as their architecture
with VGG or ResNet as base networks.
4Black-box adversarial perturbation generation for classification systems
is usually defined for the case where we only have the binary output of
the classifier on an input. For face detectors, however, there is not a clear
correspondence to that, as face detector outputs not a single label, but a set
of bounding box locations.
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of DNN based face detectors are expected to follow the
same trend. So, combining gray-box adversarial perturbations
obtained from different DNN based face detectors with known
base networks is likely to be effective for the black box
attack. Specifically, denote Fk, k = 1, · · · ,K, as DNN based
face detectors with different base networks, and Lk(z) as the
objective function for individual DNN based face detectors as
defined in Eq.(1), we find adversarial perturbation for image
I0 by solving
maxz
∑K
k=1 Lk(z), s.t. ‖z‖2 ≤ . (6)
Eq.(6) is then optimized following the algorithms described in
Section III-A and III-B, with warm start and perturbed gradient
update. In subsequent experiments (Section IV-C and IV-D),
we demonstrate the effectiveness of gray-box and black-box
attacks to DNN based face detectors.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Settings
1) Datasets: We validate our method on several widely
used data sets. We construct a dataset of 909 images, which
will be referred to as sub-WIDER subsequently, from the
validation set of the WIDER dataset [20], one of the largest
benchmark for face detection. In forming this dataset, we
exclude faces with small sizes, heavy occluded or unusual
orientations as they are not relevant for training AI face
synthesis methods.
To compare with results of previous works, we also use
two other datasets. The 300-W dataset has 600 images each
containing a single face from the test set of the 300 Faces In-
the-Wild Challenge 300-W [21]5. The sub-UMDFaces dataset
is constructed from 500 images randomly sampled from the
UMDFaces dataset [22]. Several image examples are illus-
trated in Figure 2.
2) DNN based face detectors: We consider several state-of-
the-art DNN based face detectors as the target of our exper-
iments. For Faster-RCNN based face detectors, we consider
two different base networks: vgg16 [43] and ResNet101 [44],
which are denoted by Fv16 and Fr101 respectively6. For SSD
based face detectors, we consider two state-of-the-art face
detectors: PyramidBox [19] and SFD [18]. We use ResNet50
based PyramidBox and vgg16 based SFD, which are denoted
by Pr50 and Sv16 respectively. All of these face detectors are
trained on complete WIDER training set.
3) Evaluation metric: Performance of face detection is
commonly evaluated using average precision (AP) [20], which
computes the average precision value for recall value over 0
to 1. Higher values of AP correspond to better accuracy. How-
ever, AP is not a proper metric for evaluating the performance
of adversarial perturbation. This is because AP penalizes mis-
detections but is insensitive to false detections, therefore, it
does not consider their effect on the obtained face set to be
used to train AI based face synthesis methods.
5Since ground truth faces are not labeled in 300-W, we use the detection
results of Dlib as the ground truth detection, which is also the protocol used
in a compared work [65].
6The Faster-RCNN face detector is based on [67].
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Fig. 2. Examples from datasets used in this work.
Because of this, we define a new metric, data utility quality
(DUQ), to evaluate the utility of the obtained face set when
used as training data for AI based face synthesis algorithms.
We sum up the number of true, false detections and ground
truth over all images as (# True detections), (# False detec-
tions) and (# Ground truth faces) respectively. Specifically,
DUQ is defined as
DUQ =
# True detections− # False detections
# Ground truth faces
. (7)
As the definition shows, DUQ takes value in the range
(−∞, 1], where a value 1 indicates all the faces are completely
detected while no false detections are generated. On the other
hand, a negative DUQ suggests a significant number of false
positives have been included in the face set. A lower DUQ
corresponds to a lower purity of the detection face set when
used as training data for AI face synthesis algorithms, as such,
a successful adversarial perturbation scheme should lead to
smaller DUQ values.
We also use SSIM [68] to assess the image visual quality
after adversarial perturbation. SSIM takes value in [0, 1], and
higher value corresponds to better visual quality.
4) Implementation details and running time: The proposed
adversarial perturbation generation method is implemented
with Python and package pyTorch7. Some of the key con-
stants are set as follows. The upper bound of distortion (Mean
Square Error) is set to  = 5 × 10−5. The step size in
each iteration is set to γt = 30||∇L(It)||2 . The total number
of iterations is T = 200. All experiments are performed on a
machine which is equipped an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620
v3 @ 2.40GHz with 24 cores and 96 GB RAM. The GPU we
use is a NVIDIA TITAN X (Pascal) with 12 GB memory. The
7Code will be made public upon acceptance of the paper.
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average time for generating successful adversarial perturbation
for an image is 4.69 seconds.
5) Baselines and compared methods: We evaluate the per-
formance of our method and compared with three algorithms.
The first is a simple baseline algorithm that adds random
Gaussian noise to image and is denoted as Random. The
second algorithm is based on an adversarial perturbation
generator for general object detectors [61], and is denoted as
SSOD. Specifically, SSOD attacks object detectors by reducing
the confidence score of true detections. As SSOD was trained
and evaluated on Pascal VOC dataset [69] which has no label
corresponding to human faces, to facilitate comparison, we
use the original code of SSOD and refine it on the face
datasets in our experiments. The third algorithm we compare,
denoted as NNCO, is the only existing white-box adversarial
perturbation generation method dedicated to attack DNN based
face detectors [65]. NNCO uses a GAN model with a generator
of adversarial perturbations targeting vgg16 based Faster-
RCNN face detectors trained and tested both on a same dataset
300-W. We compare our method with NNCO by both applying
them on vgg16 face detector8.
B. White-box Adversarial Perturbation Generation
Table I shows the performance of compared methods for
Faster-RCNN and SSD based face detectors with different
base networks before and after adversarial perturbations. We
show both the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbation
(DUQ) and image quality (SSIM). Figure 3 provides four
visual examples of the results of adversarial perturbation of
face images.
As these results show, face detection is significantly affected
after the adversarial perturbations generated with our method
are added to these images. For example, DUQ of Fv16 is
reduced to −4.89 from 0.81 on sub-WIDER dataset with a
minor reduction of SSIM (0.02), this shows that our method
conceal true detections in the original unperturbed image and
introduce a large number of false detections (also, see Figure
3). The same trend is observed for AP scores, which drops to
4.2% from 99.7% using our method. In contrast, SSOD can
only reduce DUQ of all face detectors on all datasets to around
0, as it only considers reducing true detections. On the other
hand, adding random Gaussian noise has almost no effect on
face detectors, suggesting that the dependency structure in the
adversarial perturbation is essential. The performance for the
SSD based DNN face detectors are similar.
Furthermore, when compared with method NNCO, our
method can reduce the DUQ of Fv16 from 0.81, 0.64, 0.55
to −4.89,−9.07,−7.52 on three datasets respectively, while
NNCO only reduces DUQ to 0.17, 0.06, 0.12. Moreover,
compared with NNCO, our method achieves better image
quality. Figure 4 shows a visual comparison of the perturbed
image generated by our method (top) and NNCO (bottom)
with enlarged area. Note the visible artifacts generated by
NNCO, which are not present in the perturbed image generated
with our method. This is corroborated by the quantitative
8There is no published code ready for use, so we re-implement their method
following the descriptions in [65].
results when comparing the SSIM scores of our method
(0.98, 0.98, 0.98) and those of NNCO (0.92, 0.91, 0.92) on all
datasets, respectively
However, adversarial perturbations generated under the
white-box setting may not be able to extend to DNN based
face detectors that use different base networks and different
network parameters. This is confirmed by a set of experiments
in which we use adversarial perturbation generated from one
face detector to other different face detectors. The performance
is evaluated in DUQ, which is shown in Table II. Ours(Fv16),
Ours(Fr101), Ours(Pr50) and Ours(Sv16) denote perturbed images
generated by our method on Fv16, Fr101, Pr50 and Sv16 face
detectors respectively. The results show that the adversarial
perturbation developed for one type of face detector can barely
extend to other face detectors.
C. Gray-box Adversarial Perturbation Generation
We next study adversarial perturbation generation under the
gray-box setting, under which we assume knowing the network
structure but not the parameters (weights) of the underlying
DNN. This reflects the practical scenario where a pre-trained
DNN based face detector is fine-tuned on different training
dataset. To simulate this effect, we compare two DNN based
face detectors, namely Faster-RCNN based face detector with
base network vgg16 (Fv16) and ResNet101 (Fr101) trained
on two different datasets, the first one is the original WIDER
dataset, and the second one is the union of WIDER and FDDB
[70]9. We denote the detectors trained on the augmented
dataset as Fv16∗ and Fr101∗. Figure 5 shows feature map
difference between (a) Fv16 and (b) Fv16∗ for the same input
image. The feature map is extracted from the last convolution
layer of the base network of Fv16 and Fv16∗ face detectors,
which contains 512 channels and we select two channels for
comparison. Note the difference between the feature maps,
reflecting that the parameters for the two base networks are
not the same.
We obtain the new perturbed images using the method
developed in Section III according to Eq.(5) for Fv16 and
Fr101, which are denoted by Ours∗(Fv16), Ours
∗
(Fr101) respec-
tively. Table III shows the DUQ score on the two face detectors
with different parameters, and indicates that the stochastic
variant of our method can create perturbations that are robust
to variations in parameters of the base network of the DNN
based face detector. For example, the DUQ of Fv16∗ is
reduced to −2.11 from 0.84 using the adversarial perturbation
by Ours∗(Fv16), with slight change of image quality.
D. Black-box Adversarial Perturbation Generation
Following the method described in Section III-C, we gener-
ate adversarial perturbations using Eq.(6) for the combination
of four face detectors for black-box attack of unknown face
detectors. Specifically, we use the following three DNN based
face detectors as the unknown face detectors:
• Faster-RCNN based face detector with base network
ResNet50 (denoted as Fr50);
9FDDB is another large face detection benchmark containing 5171 faces
in a set of 2845 images.
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Fv16 Sv16Fr101 Pr50
Fig. 3. Visual examples of our method attacking Fv16, Fr101, Pr50 and Sv16 respectively. The top row corresponds to detection results on
original images. The middle row corresponds to the detection results on images after adversarial perturbation are added to the original
image. The bottom row show the actual noise added, which are amplified by 30 for better visualization.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION GENERATION AGAINST FASTER-RCNN AND SSD BASED FACE DETECTORS ON THREE DATASETS.
FV16 AND FR101 DENOTE FASTER-RCNN BASED FACE DETECTOR WITH BASE NETWORK VGG16 [43] AND RESNET101 [44]. PR50 DENOTES
PYRAMIDBOX [19] WITH BASE NETWORK RESNET50 AND SV16 DENOTES SFD [18] WITH BASE NETWORK VGG16.
Adversarial Perturbation Sub-WIDER 300-W Sub-UMDFaces
Generation Method Fv16 Fr101 Pr50 Sv16 Fv16 Fr101 Pr50 Sv16 Fv16 Fr101 Pr50 Sv16
DUQ
Original 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.88 0.64 0.64 0.76 0.81 0.55 0.54 0.64 0.64
Random 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.81 0.64 0.64 0.76 0.81 0.54 0.54 0.64 0.64
NNCO [65] 0.17 - - - 0.06 - - - 0.12 - - -
SSOD [61] -0.06 -0.21 -0.74 -0.53 -0.02 -0.03 -0.81 -1.01 -0.18 -0.65 -0.88 -0.99
Ours -4.89 -7.98 -19.18 -9.40 -9.07 -7.95 -17.91 -8.80 -7.52 -9.91 -26.88 -8.80
SSIM NNCO [65] 0.92 - - - 0.91 - - - 0.92 - - -SSOD [61] 1.0 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.98 1.0 1.0 0.95 0.98
Ours 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.96
• SSD based face detector SSH [17] with base networks
vgg16 (denoted as SSHv16);
• SSD based face detector SSH [17] with base networks
ResNet50 (SSHr50).
All the experiments are conducted on sub-WIDER dataset.
We denote our adversarial perturbation generation method
targeting the ensemble of known face detectors as
Ours(Fv16+Fr101+Pr50+Sv16) as described in Section III-C.
For comparison, we adapt the adversarial perturbation
generation scheme for general object detectors [61] to
face detectors, and denote the corresponding method as
SSOD(Fv16+Fr101+Pr50). Unlike our method, SSOD can only be
extended to the black-box setting by generating adversarial
perturbations for different face detectors independently, and
then uses their summation as the final perturbations to any
unknown face detectors. On the other hand, our method is
based on an optimization problem, Eq. (6), and also considers
false detections.
Table IV shows the performance evaluated in DUQ of SSOD
and our method. In addition, Figure 6 shows three examples
of black-box attack on Fr50, SSHv16 and SSHr50. As the
adversarial perturbations are obtained by considering the four
known DNN based face detectors, they are expected to work
well in those cases for all methods, which is confirmed by
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE EVALUATED IN DUQ FOR ATTACKING FACE DETECTORS
USING DIFFERENT ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION. FV16 AND FR101
DENOTE FASTER-RCNN BASED FACE DETECTOR WITH BASE NETWORK
VGG16 [43] AND RESNET101 [44]. PR50 DENOTES PYRAMIDBOX [19]
WITH BASE NETWORK RESNET50 AND SV16 DENOTES SFD [18] WITH
BASE NETWORK VGG16.
Fv16 Fr101 Pr50 Sv16
Original 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.88
Ours(Fv16) -4.98 0.41 0.71 0.42
Ours(Fr101) 0.66 -7.98 0.89 0.84
Ours(Pr50) 0.71 0.74 -19.18 0.78
Ours(Sv16) 0.02 0.58 0.32 -9.40
NNCO Ours
Fig. 4. Visual comparison of the perturbed images between NNCO
[65] and our method. We can the see the perturbed images generated
by [65] has clear artifacts in the skin of faces, while the perturbations
generated by our method are hardly to be perceived.
their performance under the white-box setting.
When applied to unknown DNN based face detectors, both
methods tend to be effective in reducing DUQ of the resulting
face set. However, our method shows more reduction and
usually leads to negative DUQ scores, suggesting that it
generates more false detections, and thus is more effective
in reducing the quality of the face set as training data for
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Illustration of feature map difference between (a) Fv16 and
(b) Fv16∗ for the same input image. We select two channels (top and
bottom row) from the output of base network for comparison.
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF GRAY-BOX ATTACK FOR TWO REFINED DNN BASED
FACE DETECTORS. FV16∗ AND FR101∗ DENOTE FASTER-RCNN BASED
FACE DETECTOR WITH BASE NETWORK VGG16 [43] AND RESNET101
[44], WHICH ARE TRAINED ON THE UNION OF WIDER [20] AND FDDB
[70].
SSIM Fv16∗ Fr101∗
Original 1.0 0.84 0.91
Ours∗(Fv16) 0.98 -2.11 0.72
Ours∗(Fr101) 0.96 0.78 -1.85
AI face synthesis system. This is further corroborated by the
visual results shown in Figure 6.
E. Robustness
We further evaluate the robustness of our adversarial per-
turbation generation method with regards to several types
of image processing operations including JPEG compression,
additive noise and blurring. The results are obtained on the
sub-WIDER dataset.
1) JPEG Compression: We generate perturbed images then
JPEG compressed them with different quality factors [60 :
100]. Figure 7 (top) illustrates DUQ performance of face detec-
tors on perturbed images with compression degree decreasing.
The blue line denotes original images and the red line denotes
perturbed images. We observe that the JPEG compression to
original images does not affect DUQ performance, but the
JPEG compression to perturbed images degrades the attacking
performance. Compared to Fr101 and Pr50, the curves for
Fv16 and Sv16 degrade more slowly, which indicates these
two face detectors are affected by adversarial perturbation even
after JPEG compression. It is probably because Fr101 and
Pr50 are more robust to adversarial perturbation attack than
Fv16 and Sv16.
2) Additive White Noise: We also evaluate the robustness
of our method with regards to additive white Gaussian noise
N (0, σadd), where the standard deviation σadd is set to [0 : 10].
σadd = 0 denotes no additive noise is added. The effectiveness
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE EVALUATED IN DUQ FOR BLACK-BOX ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION GENERATION. ROWS DENOTE PERTURBED IMAGES GENERATED
FROM DIFFERENT CASES. COLUMNS DENOTE DIFFERENT FACE DETECTORS. FV16 AND FR101 DENOTE FASTER-RCNN BASED FACE DETECTOR WITH
BASE NETWORK VGG16 [43] AND RESNET101 [44]. PR50 DENOTES PYRAMIDBOX FACE DETECTOR [19] WITH BASE NETWORK RESNET50 AND SV16
DENOTES SFD FACE DETECTOR [18] WITH BASE NETWORK VGG16. THE LAST THREE COLUMN FR50, SSHV16, SSHR50 ARE BLACK-BOX FACE
DETECTORS, WHICH ARE FASTER-RCNN BASED FACE DETECTOR WITH BASE NETWORK RESNET50 AND SSH [17] WITH BASE NETWORK VGG16 AND
RESNET50.
SSIM known face detectors unknown face detectorsFv16 Fr101 Pr50 Sv16 Fr50 SSHv16 SSHr50
Original 1.0 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.94
SSOD(Fv16+Fr101+Pr50+Sv16) 0.95 0.14 0.34 0.26 0.04 0.57 0.65 0.66
Ours(Fv16+Fr101+Pr50+Sv16) 0.91 -4.94 -5.69 -14.14 -6.37 -1.72 -0.26 -0.47
Fr50 SSHv16 SSHr50
Fig. 6. Visual examples of black-box attack on Fr50, SSHv16 and SSHr50 face detectors respectively. The top row corresponds to detection
results on original images. The middle row corresponds to the detection results on images after adversarial perturbation are added to the
original image. The bottom row show the actual noise added, which are amplified by 30 for better visualization.
of additive noise is shown in Figure 7 (middle). We observe
the DUQ performance of face detectors on perturbed images
is recovered slowly with additive noise scale increased, which
indicates the adversarial perturbations have ability to resist
the disruption of additive noise. Similar to the trends in JPEG
compression, Fv16 and Sv16 raises more smoothly compared
to Fr101 and Pr50.
3) Blurring: Gaussian blurring smooths the image using
Gaussian blurring kernel, which could affect the adversarial
perturbation attack. In our case, we use kernel N (0, σblur) with
size 5 × 5 for blurring. For different blurring scales, we set
the standard deviation σblur to [0 : 4], where σblur = 0 denotes
no blurring is applied. The effectiveness of blurring is shown
in Figure 7 (bottom), which reveals the attacking ability of
adversarial perturbation is degraded with σblur increasing and
has almost no effect when σblur > 2.
V. CONCLUSION
AI synthesized fake faces are becoming a problem en-
croaching our trust to online media. As most AI based face
synthesis algorithms require automatic face detection as an
indispensable pre-processing step in preparing training data, an
effective protection scheme can be obtained by disrupting the
face detection methods. In this work, we develop a proactive
protection method to deter bulk reuse of automatically detected
face for the production of AI synthesized faces. Our method
exploits the sensitivity of DNN based face detectors and use
adversarial perturbation to contaminate the face sets. This is
achieved by generating imperceptible adversarial perturbations
to disrupt face detectors. We describe attacking schemes for
white-box, gray-box and black-box settings, and empirically
show the effectiveness of our methods in disrupting state-of-
the-art DNN based face detectors on several datasets.
We expect this technology to solicit counter-measures from
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Fig. 7. The effect of JPEG compression, additive noise and blurring on DUQ performance of each face detector. See text for more details.
the forgery makers. In particular, operations that can destroy
or reduce the adversarial perturbation are expected to be
developed. It is thus our continuing effort to improve the
robustness of the adversarial perturbation generation method.
Another important direction to further explore is a more
generic black-box attack scheme that does not limit to DNN
based face detectors and do not rely on the differentialbility
of the underlying model. Furthermore, we will also work on
improving the running time efficiency of the current method
so it can scale up to large number of images.
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